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Abstract 
 
Chaïm Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca‟s Traité de l'argumentation: la 
nouvelle rhétorique marked a revolution in twentieth-century rhetorical theory.  In 
this essay, we trace Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca‟s turn from logical positivism 
and the accepted belief that reason‟s domain was the vita contemplativa to rhetoric 
and its use as a reason designed for the vita activa.  Our effort to tell the story of 
their rhetorical turn, which took place between 1944 and 1950, is informed by an 
account of the context in which they considered questions of reason, responsibility, 
and action in the wake of World War II. 
 
 
“In the aftermath of the Second World War,” writes Christian 
Delacampagne in his History of Philosophy in the Twentieth 
Century, “it became necessary . . . to understand how, in the space of 
two centuries, the Enlightenment could have lost its way as it did. 
This meant having to treat reason itself as a case to be opened up for 
investigation” (1999, 157). One key illustration of Delacampagne‟s 
observation is H. J. Pos‟ welcome to the Tenth International 
Congress of Philosophy on August 11, 1948. Pos called his 
colleagues to open up the case of reason and challenge the received 
tradition restricting the realm of reason to speculation and inaction 
(1948, 3-10). The Tenth Congress, Pos observed, had been scheduled 
to take place in Groningen, Netherlands in 1941, with Leo Polak 
presiding as President.  Polak, Pos noted poignantly, was a secular 
Jew, excluded from university teaching when the Nazis occupied the 
Netherlands, and died in the Sachsenhausen concentration camp on 
December 9, 1941. 
  
 
     
The loss of Polak, and many other philosophers during the War, 
prompted Pos to observe that philosophy was now more concerned 
with life itself “much more than before” (5). This new attitude, Pos 
continued, confronted 
 
An old speculative tradition we inherited from a certain current of Greek thought 
whose leader was Aristotle and whose device was that contemplation was the 
sweetest and noblest occupation.  This is the attitude that created metaphysics and 
ontology and that flourished until the Renaissance, and the times, when, as Aristotle 
holds too, rest was deemed nobler than motion and the sense of the eternal prevailed 
over the temporal and secular aspects of things. (6) 
 
Reason, Pos argued, must be active in time, and in a fitting chiasmus, 
called philosophers to a “life of reason and reason as a life” (6).  
Reason must be enlarged, insisted Pos, to include knowing, willing, 
and feeling, and liberated to assist with the problems of the practical 
life, both personal and social. 
Chaïm Perelman, a professor at the Université Libre de Bruxelles 
(Free University of Brussels), was in the audience. Like Polak, 
Perelman was a secular Jew, dismissed by the Nazis from his post in 
1941 because he was a Jew.  Unlike Polak, Perelman survived and 
after the liberation of Belgium in September 1944, returned to the 
Free University as a professor (Schreiber 1999).  Perelman, who had 
written on questions of logic before the war, started and completed a 
book on justice during the war, took up the case of reason and its 
relationship with justice after the war (Perelman 1945b). 
Approaching the notion of justice through the prism of logical 
positivism as he had before the war, he reached the conclusion that 
there were no reasonable grounds for justice. He found this approach 
dissatisfying (Perelman 1979, 8). 
Until his turn to rhetoric, Perelman remained under the spell of 
Aristotle and the classical tradition as he continued to make a clear 
distinction between the vita activa and the vita contemplativa, 
agreeing with the Enlightenment philosophers that the domain of 
reason was the latter (Perelman 1944-1945).   Hannah Arendt‟s work 
on the origins of the separation of the vita activa and the vita 
contemplativa is much more developed than that of Perelman, and 
she traces the notion of the vita contemplativa to the Greek notion of 
bios theōrētikos, which became the “ideal of contemplation 
(theōria)” (Arendt 1958a, 14).  In the Classical tradition, the 
contemplative life trumped the active life at every turn.  Arendt 
  
 
     
observed, “Traditionally and up to the beginning of the modern age, 
the term vita activa never lost its negative connotation of “unquiet” . 
. .” (1958a, 15). Speech and rhetoric, which manifest themselves in 
noise, disturbance, movement, and change, were at best preludes to 
the objective of the silence of contemplation and eternity.  Aristotle, 
Arendt continued, made clear distinctions between quite and unquiet, 
stillness and movement, and the absolute nature of Truth.  The vita 
contemplativa, in this vision, sheds political activity and debate, as 
argument does not yield the experience of the eternal, which 
“discloses itself to mortal eyes only when all human movements and 
activities are at perfect rest.  Compared with this attitude of quite, all 
distinctions and articulations within the vita activa disappear. Seen 
from the viewpoint of contemplation, it does not matter what disturbs 
the necessary quite, as long as it is disturbed” (1958a, 15-16). 
Like Arendt and Pos, Perelman sought a more robust and 
humane expression of reason, one that would live in the world. 
Perelman taught a course on logic during the first semester of his 
return to the Free University. A notebook in the Free University 
archives, labeled 1944-1945, contains a narrative outline of his view 
of logic during this period. In the first paragraph of the notebook, he 
wrote, “philosophy deals with matters of contemplation, not action” 
(1944-1945, 2). Because philosophy and reason were limited to 
“matters of contemplation,” it followed that there could be no 
reasonable or rational bases for the vita activa. This conclusion was 
troubling for Perelman, as it was for Pos and other philosophers in 
the immediate aftermath of the war.  In this paper, we chart the 
trajectory of Perelman‟s attempt to join the vita contemplativa and 
the vita activa to the life of reason through a new and revitalized 
rhetoric. 
 
 
Reason, the Vita Activa, and the Reconstruction of Europe 
 
In the wake of the war, Perelman wrote a host of articles and 
smaller think pieces on reason, logic, and civil affairs.  A voracious 
reader, Perelman took notes of the many books and articles that dealt 
with issues of rationality and freedom.  He struggled in his writings 
between 1944 and 1948 to bring liberty, reason, rationality, and 
justice into the realm of action. In the fifteen articles that he 
published between 1945 and 1949, he endeavored to work through 
  
 
     
the limitation of reason to the vita contemplativa (Perelman 1945a, 
1946, 1947d, 1947a, 1948d, 1948c, 1948b, 1948g, 1949e, 1949c, 
1949d, 1949b, 1950a, 1950c). His efforts took place against a 
backdrop of a dominant philosophical movement of anti-metaphysics 
and a French sponsored culture of intellectual irresponsibility. 
European and British philosophy immediately before and after 
the war was characterized by its anti-metaphysical stance (Collins 
1998, 751). When Perelman engaged in his struggles to move reason 
into the public realm, he did so in the face of two conflicting 
expressions of anti-metaphysical philosophy: logical positivism and 
a cluster consisting of phenomenalism- existentialism- 
deconstructionism.  Collins notes that “the two antithetical traditions 
are network cousins, full of common ancestors . . .  All sides of the 
realigning factions of the twentieth century emerged from the 
struggles over the foundation of mathematics at the turn of the 
century” (751). The logical positivists fully embraced the foundation 
of mathematics and denied metaphysics as meaningless; those in the 
cluster assumed nominalism, rejecting as absurd any notion of 
metaphysics or principles that would guide action. 
Placing his own thinking in context, Perelman wrote:  “in 1929, 
the same year which saw the publication of the Vienna Circle‟s 
manifesto, that my own philosophical development began” 
(Perelman 1979, 55). The manifesto, entitled “Scientific Conception 
of the World: The Vienna Circle,” codified the beliefs of Europe‟s 
most prominent scientists, including Gustav Bergmann, Rudolf 
Carnap, and Kurt Gödel.  These scientists celebrated logical 
empiricism, scientific empiricism, and neo-positivism, holding to a 
vision of a unified science.  The manifesto reduced proof to 
deduction, induction, calculation, and experiment, creating a climate 
in which philosophy, value judgments, metaphysics, ethics, and 
religion were dismissed as activities of the irrational.  In the postwar 
period, Perelman argued that this climate contributed to the 
“torment” of those who lived during the period between 1929 and the 
postwar period who could not turn to scientific empiricism for rules 
for action. In a remarkable address to his students in 1948, Perelman 
explained: 
 
The theoretical crisis that tormented your elders during the period between the two 
wars [was due to the] . . . limitation of scientific method to scientific problems, 
[which] left us without rules of action, without conviction that one could honestly 
accept outside of science itself. (1949a, 46-47) 
  
 
     
 
Perelman acknowledged the descriptive powers of science, and 
posed questions about its limitations: 
 
. . . how do we find directives for the action that, itself, is not satisfied at all with 
describing but wants to influence what is? Where do we find the rules of action? 
Loyalty to scientism could not provide them. We lived with a certain unease at the 
Free University because we could not oppose a positive doctrine to fascist slogans, 
to dogmatism, to fanaticism, to the appeal to force that these doctrines advocated. 
And among a large number of us, who were young at the time, we saw a skepticism 
appear that could too easily degenerate into cynicism, a lack of discipline that could 
turn into anarchy, an indifference that too often could resemble cowardice. (46) 
 
Scientism thus did not provide rules for action, according to 
Perelman. For Sartre, who like Perelman rejected metaphysics, 
existentialism provided an answer in absolutized action. 
Sartre himself delineates existentialism as action. As Wilkinson 
recounts, Sartre explained in 1945 that existentialism “defines man 
through action” (81). This view of action was devoid of faith in 
reason (Judt 1992, 1998). The “early” Sartrean philosophy was best 
displayed in his L'être et le néant of 1943. In this work, Sartre 
valorized action, but only as an expression of subjective choice.  As 
Tony Judt notes, Sartre rejected tradition or any form of social 
conventions, holding that “all subjectivities remain totally separate 
and doomed to infinite and unresolvable collision”(1992, 80). 
Sartre‟s existentialism “precluded any attention to ethics and 
morality”(Judt 1992, 80).  In Judt‟s opinion, 
 
Engagement and freedom, then meant something very distinctive and morally 
neutral to Sartre.  Since we have no grounds for seeking to bring about any 
particular social or political objective, for which we could offer no universally valid 
or acceptable argument, we act as we choose for reasons that are not intrinsically 
better or worse than those of people who act in opposite ways. (1992, 81) 
 
Radical skepticism, Perelman argued, was not a positive doctrine, 
and was unable to provide the grounds of value choice and action. 
Judt‟s term of “moral bifocalism” is useful to understand the 
philosophical context of the postwar period, because it clearly 
describes the unwillingness of French intellectuals to think seriously 
about public ethics, especially in two major areas: the postwar self-
induced collective amnesia of French intellectuals regarding their 
role in France‟s Vichy past, and the utter absence of consensus about 
  
 
     
justice in postwar France, which led to their confused response to 
injustice, especially in Communist systems (Judt 1992, 47, 75, 178). 
With perhaps the exceptions of Aron, Blum, and Camus, many 
French and Belgian intellectuals—and Judt includes Sartre, Merleau-
Ponty, Mounier, and de Beauvoir among them—failed to act 
responsibly because they had rejected liberal democracy, and in the 
void, adopted philosophical and moral outlooks that could not yield 
rules for ethics or action.  Paul De Man, a Belgian who set forth 
another famous theory of rhetoric, is a clear example of Judt‟s thesis 
(LaCapra 1992). De Man, who attended the Free University during 
the same years as Perelman, and who studied in the same department 
during the 1939-1940 academic year, collaborated with the Nazis as 
a writer for the Brussels newspaper Le Soir (De Man et al. 1989). 
The reigning philosophical movements were thus of no help to 
Perelman, given their declared rejection of metaphysics and social 
axiology. Recognizing this failure of ethics and responsibility, 
Perelman sought to construct a system of reason and a new 
rationality designed for the vita activa. 
 
 
Perelman, Rhetoric, and the Vita Activa 
 
In his diagnosis of the tragedy of World War II, Perelman found 
both logical positivism and radical skepticism complicit in the 
actions taken by the totalitarians and those who should have resisted 
tyranny.  The key notion in this analysis was responsibility. Those 
who reduced reason to scientism and logical positivism, holding with 
the Vienna Circle that value judgments were meaningless, were 
absolved of responsibility for actions taken outside the range of this 
constricted view of reason.  Similarly, the radical skeptic and those 
who professed Sartrean existentialism could not be held responsible 
for their actions because no value or standard could be held better or 
stronger than another. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca would later 
codify this point.  “The fanatic”, they write, “bows to an absolute and 
irrefragable truth; the skeptic refutes the commitment [to any truth] 
under the pretext that he does not find it sufficiently definitive” 
(1969a, 69). The exclusion of reason from the realm of justice and 
action constituted a crisis of reason, of which Pos spoke at the Tenth 
International Congress. 
  
 
     
The several short articles Perelman wrote during this period 
(1945-1950) dealt directly with the crisis of reason.  He was fully 
aware that before and during the war reason had been kidnapped by 
totalitarian governments and put in their service.  During the same 
time period, Horkheimer and Ardorno had completed their Dialectic 
of Enlightenment, concluding that the “fully enlightened earth 
radiates disaster triumphant,” and Hannah Arendt had located 
deduction as the primary logic of totalitarianism (Arendt 1958b; 
Horkheimer and Adorno 1994, 3).  Perelman agreed with this 
critique of reason, but saw the dangers of rejecting the authority of 
reason without providing a positive alternative (Perelman 1949a, 40). 
Long before Habermas set forth the notion of a “performative 
contradiction” and Foucault warned of the Enlightenment 
“blackmail” of reason by holding it within the realm of the vita 
contemplativa, Perelman worked through a vision of reason that 
navigated between the Charbydis of Enlightenment certainty and the 
Scylla of radical skepticism to a realm of reason that dealt with 
human opinion as a legitimate form of knowledge (Habermas 1987, 
112; Foucault 1984, 41-42).  He sought an expression of reason that 
did not constrain liberty, like the iron chains of the syllogism, but 
still had the power to offer reasonable decisions. In all of these 
writings, it is clear that Perelman was motivated to move reason into 
the realm of action to allow for judgments in the public sphere. He 
established the conditions of his rhetorical turn in a series of essays 
on liberty, responsibility, free choice, democracy, rationality and 
reason, and a critically important article in which he displayed a 
metaphysics for a system of reason based on freedom and probable 
truths. A brief summary of the central ideas raised in these essays 
will demonstrate how they form the backdrop of the Perelman and 
Olbrechts-Tyteca‟s new rhetoric project and its aspirations. 
Liberty and Responsibility. In his essay on the two problems of 
human liberty, delivered to the Tenth International Congress of 
Philosophy, Perelman observed: 
 
The first problem with liberty is the one that ties this notion to the one of 
responsibility. If certain beings are considered as agents in the moral domain, if they 
can be the objects of favorable or unfavorable moral appreciation, if one can praise 
them or blame them, if one distinguishes them as objects and others as beings that 
are considered irresponsible, it is because they possess liberty. It is liberty that 
distinguishes men from the rest of nature; it gives man the quality of agent and 
accords value to an act that he realizes. In nature, under the necessary laws, there 
will only be phenomenon. (1948c, 580) 
  
 
     
 
Accordingly, reason for Perelman would need to allow for 
responsibility and human liberty. Humans have agency, Perelman 
argued, because they can make choices, and these choices, in turn, 
link the vita contemplativa with the vita activa. Perelman was then 
led to consider the nature of the “good choice” (Perelman 1948b). 
Free choice and decision. One must think before one acts, wrote 
Perelman, and one cannot act without choosing among various 
options.  Not to choose is nevertheless to act by not choosing 
(Perelman 1948b, 143). Humans, given the liberty of choice, have 
traditions and social mores that can be used to help frame questions 
of values, justice and action.  These traditions and mores are open to 
challenge and revision, but they still provide some grounding for 
value choice and action. New issues and experiences may place 
social traditions into conflict with the individual conscience.  When 
such conflict takes place, it may be necessary to rectify the social 
tradition.  Here, Perelman has introduced a theme that eventually 
blossoms into the New Rhetoric‟s take on epideictic discourse, as he 
features the importance of social tradition as a contingent ground of 
decision making. Humans, Perelman concludes, have both freedom 
to choose and are guided by socially embedded systems of 
rationality. Accordingly, the choices leading to actions have 
grounding in reason. This grounding, which links freedom to 
rationality, flourishes in systems that are authentically democratic. 
Truth and democracy.   In two articles, Perelman investigated the 
relationships among truth, free inquiry, and democracy (Perelman 
1948f, 1946).
 Perelman devoted “Free Thought and Democracy” to a 
brief rehearsal of the role played by the Free University in the 
resistance to the German occupation. Perelman maintained that the 
University had played a central role in defying the Nazis (Perelman 
1946, 37-38). The period between the two wars, Perelman observed, 
was characterized by a negative critique of authority expressed as 
anti-fascism (37). After the war, resistance to authority, influenced 
by the totalitarian impulse to collapse unique entities into the whole, 
emphasized the preservation of the individual.  Each individual has a 
special dignity, deserving of respect, and it is here that democracy, in 
vesting the opinion of the individual with a protected status, 
functions to secure an irreducible pluralism (40-41). 
A truly democratic society assumes as normative the existence of 
many and multiple absolute values, some which may conflict at 
  
 
     
given times (Perelman 1948f, 37). In comparison to totalitarian 
societies that cannot tolerate the co-existence of opposing absolute 
values, democratic societies thrive on the confusion and disorder of 
variegated value hierarchies. At this point, Perelman confesses he is 
reluctant to go beyond Abraham Lincoln‟s definition of democracy 
as a political system in which power is vested in “the people.”  This 
definition, he suggests, should remained confused, beyond the reach 
of absolute clarity. 
As a confused notion, democracy would lend itself to varied 
definitions and applications.  Within this variance, Perelman 
concluded, would reside a view of power and institutional 
arrangements predicated on the values of the individuals working in 
concert with society. These issues were of great importance in the 
immediate aftermath of the War as Europe in general and Belgium in 
particular were seeking to rebuild civil society.  The reconstruction 
of civil society required a much broader vision of reason, one that 
would participate directly in matters of value, action, and justice. 
Toward this end, Perelman in his writings turned to the relationship 
between reason and philosophy. 
Reason and Philosophy.  During this period, Perelman sought a 
new rationalism, and outlined what he hoped would be a much 
expanded view of philosophy.  This outline appears in brief form in 
an article on Perelman‟s view of the philosophical method as it is 
distinguished from other approaches, and in an exchange between 
Perelman, Jean Piaget and other prominent thinkers on the need to 
seek a rationality capable of dealing with experience (Perelman 
1948e, 1947a). Perelman broadens this outline in a long two-part 
article in the Swiss journal Dialectica in which Perelman 
summarized the philosophical, axiological, and sociological beliefs 
of his mentor, Eugène Dupréel (Perelman 1947b, 1948a).  Dupréel, 
who had published books on the sophists, sociology, and a collection 
of essays on pluralism in the years 1948-49, was a major influence 
on Perelman and Olbechts-Tyteca (Olbrechts-Tyteca 1963).
 
As 
Olbrechts-Tytca recounts, Dupréel, who had highlighted the values 
of the sophists, the importance of opinion, encouraged them to 
consider the ideas of Gorgias. 
Dupréel‟s ideas found their way to the core of Perelman‟s vision 
of a reconstituted sense of reason.  In his review of Dupréel‟s body 
of work, Perelman considered the notions of knowledge, truth, 
necessity, chance, causality and probability, reality and appearance, 
  
 
     
skepticism, modern logic, and what Perelman termed the “new spirit 
of philosophy(Perelman 1948a, 73-77).”  Perelman revealed how 
Dupréel‟s vision made possible the judgment of values and action.  
For our purpose, it is important to note the manner in which 
Perelman found in Dupréel the potential to place reason in the vita 
activa. 
Dupréel was a sociologist interested in questions of value.  He 
believed that values could be communicated and negotiated.  Values 
were important in Perelman‟s interpretation of Dupréel‟s thought 
because they were precursors of action (Perelman 1947c, 358). 
Values, Dupréel maintained, were rooted in irreducible plurality.  
This plurality called for ambiguity, and Dupréel placed the notion of 
confusion against Descartes‟ belief that knowledge must be clear.  
As such, Dupréel argued that “provisional knowledge” was 
legitimate, and should be included in studies of epistemology 
(Perelman 1948a, 75-77). Truth, necessity, chance, causality and 
probability, reality and appearance--key terms in logic and 
philosophy--were linked by Dupréel to the social and empirical 
worlds. 
At the end of his review of Dupréel, Perelman discussed modern 
logic and the new philosophical insights.  Modern logic and 
philosophy, according to Dupréel, would need a revised sense of 
logic that should enter the world of values and action.  Dupréel 
insisted that room be made for the uncertain, the confused, and the 
unknown.  However, he was equally insistent on the possibility of 
communication, understanding, and justice. 
Although Dupréel did not value rhetoric, Perelman embellished 
Dupréel‟s ideas, importing them into the new rhetoric project.  
Influenced by Dupréel, Perelman considered the failure of reason, 
narrowly defined by the logical positivists, to include liberty and 
experience. In turn, he detected the inhumanity in a rationality 
devoid of contact with the world, and in a later article, cited Bertrand 
Russell‟s position that the fully rational human (a rationality that 
excluded emotions including empathy) would be an “inhuman 
monster” (Perelman 1979, 118). 
Perelman‟s search for a notion of reason that could embrace 
freedom and rationality became a life long project that he initiated 
with Lucie Obrechts-Tyteca in 1947.   Their search led them to 
Paulhan‟s Les Fleurs de Tarbes, ou la Terreur dans les Lettres.  
Paulhan held that rhetoric used clichés as commonplaces necessary 
  
 
     
to secure the possibility of communication, a key notion for 
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca. It was, however, the appendix, 
which contained excerpts from Brunetto Latini‟s Trésor, which 
caught their attention, inspiring the new rhetoric project. Brunetto 
Latini (1220-1294), a Florentine rhetorician who translated Cicero‟s 
De Inventione, provides a key late-medieval example of the 
resurgent interest in rhetoric‟s role in human life. Latini‟s works, 
according to George Kennedy, signal the beginning of the study of 
rhetoric in vernacular languages (Kennedy 1999, 216). In part three 
of Li livres dou Trésor, within a discussion of politics, Latini 
composes an exposition of Cicero‟s logic, with its emphasis on 
rhetoric, the “most important science relative to governing the city” 
(Latini 1993, 279). Latini‟s work illustrated the broad vision of 
reason, rhetoric, and civil affairs defining the vita activa during the 
Renaissance, which, according to Dominic A. LaRusso, was 
“marked by its concern for humanitas, that unique blend of 
conception, passion, and expression” (LaRusso 1978, 55). When 
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca read Brunetto‟s translation of 
Cicero‟s rhetoric, they called it a “revelation” (Olbrechts-Tyteca 
1963 , 5-6; Perelman 1977, 9) 
This revelation was sparked by Cicero‟s claim that rhetoric was 
essential: “for if there were no speech, there would be no city, nor 
would there be any establishment of justice or of human company .  .  
. .” (Latini 1993, 294). Here, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca were 
reminded of the role rhetoric played in the Renaissance and in the 
ancient time period as a vehicle in the vita activa.   Perelman, in 
particular, must have been drawn to the connection Cicero made 
between rhetoric and justice.  Even more important, Perelman and 
Olbrechts-Tyteca rediscovered an expression of reason located 
between scientism and radical skepticism: the reason of practical 
wisdom.  From here, Perelman saw the connection between liberty 
and reason cast as rhetoric. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca situate 
their work within this very tradition in the introduction of the New 
Rhetoric: “the present book is mostly related to the concerns of the 
Renaissance and, beyond that, to those certain Greek and Latin 
authors” who studied rhetoric (1969a, 5). They rediscovered the 
rhetorical tradition and then refurbished it to serve as the expression 
of reason intended for questions of action and value. 
When Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca announced in the first 
pages of the New Rhetoric that they saw their work as a “break” from 
  
 
     
Enlightenment thinking, they did so with the intent of emancipating 
reason from the metaphysics of Parmenides and the Classical 
tradition. In his later writings, Perelman unveils the metaphysical 
foundation of the vita contemplativa in the poem, “On Nature,” by 
the pre-Socratic Parmenides.  Perelman points to the “everyday 
experience” of a “variety of different beings and phenomona” and 
that the “birth of Western metaphysics is to be traced to the great 
poem of Parmenides, who sets against this multiplicity of 
appearances an eternal and uniform reality conforming to the 
demands of reason.  Parmenides‟ philosophy takes the form of an 
ontological monism . . .” (Perelman, 1979 62).  Parmenides, 
according to Perelman, “started the centuries-old debate . . . which 
has set philosophy against rhetoric . . . .” (62).  Under the influence 
of Parmenides, philosophy and philosophers in the Western tradition 
have sought impersonal truth, condemning rhetoricians for their 
concern with the vagaries of human opinion (Perelman 1982, 153). 
Perelman crystallizes his quarrel with Parmenides and the 
Classical tradition in his response to Stanley Rosen (Perelman 1959). 
He traces this tradition beyond Antiquity, through the late nineteenth 
century: “What I call the classical tradition, starting with Plato and 
Aristotle, continues with St. Augustine, St. Thomas, Duns Scotus, 
Descartes, Leibniz, and Spinoza and is carried on by empiricism and 
logical positivism¸ as it is represented by early Wittgenstein of the 
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus” (86). Perelman continued: 
 
. . . the tradition I called classical assigns but little importance, as far as achieving 
science and contemplation goes, either to practice or to the historical and situated 
aspects of knowledge. . . .  This viewpoint is held in common by Plato and Aristotle, 
as well as by thinkers such as Descartes . . . The tradition I call classical includes all 
those who believe that by means of self-evidence, intuitions--either rational or 
empirical--or supernatural revelation, the human being is capable of acquiring 
knowledge of immutable and eternal truths, which are the perfect and imperfectable 
reflexion of an objective reality. (86) 
 
Perelman does underplay what Kimball has described as the story, 
beginning with Isocrates and Plato, of the debate between the orators 
and the philosophers.  This story, in which the figure of Cicero 
looms large, concerns a resistance to the speculative impulse in 
Hellenistic thought. This resistance was not meant to supplant the 
vita contemplativa with the vita activa; rather, it was intended to 
align the two realms of reason and reasoning.  The speculative 
philosophers, Cicero argued, were insisting on a false choice. 
  
 
     
Thought and action, wisdom and expression, must be joined.  Roman 
orators and those of the Italian Middle Ages insisted on the value of 
the vita activa: their philosophically-grounded rhetoric sets forth the 
role that reason might play in human affairs and questions of justice. 
The centrality of humanitas is a touchstone of Perelman‟s efforts in 
the post war period to extend reason into the vita activa.  Perelman 
and Olbrechts-Tyteca worked ten years to develop a philosophical 
rationale for extending a rhetorically-inflected view of reason into 
the vita activa. In returning to the Ciceronian vision of rhetoric, 
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca saw it as a vehicle for reconstructing 
post-war Europe and the world society. 
After the revelation sparked by Paulhan‟s work, Perelman wrote 
a keystone article, published in Dialectica in 1949, in which he 
distills his thinking on the crises of reason.  Here, he coalesced a 
metaphysics and a vision of reason for the vita activa.  Perelman 
discussed rhetoric for the first time in this article, linking it directly 
to responsibility and liberty.  We quote at length from this article as 
it reveals an originary moment of the major rhetorical system of the 
twentieth century, with its narrative move of reason into the vita 
activa: 
 
Only rhetoric, and not logic, allows the understanding of putting the principle of 
responsibility into play. In formal logic, a demonstration is either convincing or it is 
not, and the liberty of the thinker is outside of it. However, the arguments that one 
employs in rhetoric influence thought, but never oblige his agreement. The thinker 
commits himself by making a decision. His competence, sincerity, integrity, in a 
word, his responsibility are at stake. When it is a matter of problems concerning 
foundations (and all philosophical problems are tied herein), the researcher is like a 
judge who has to judge equitably. We may wonder if, after having sought for 
centuries the model of philosophical thought in mathematics and in the exact 
sciences, we might not instead compare it to that of lawyers, who sometimes have to 
develop a new law and sometimes have to apply an existing law to concrete 
situations. 
It is this practical aspect, this almost moral aspect of philosophical activity that 
allows the rejection of a purely negative skepticism. The skeptic rejects every 
absolute criterion, but believes that it is impossible for him to decide since he lacks 
such a criterion, just as in first philosophies. But he forgets that in the domain of 
action, not to choose is still making a choice, and that one runs even greater risks by 
abstaining than by acting. (1949d, 198) 
 
Perelman yokes responsibility to reason for the purpose of just 
action. Rhetoric moved the focus of reason, which had been 
concerned with matters of demonstration and the apodictic, to the 
  
 
     
values and potential actions of the audience. The objective of the 
new rhetoric project, as Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca would later 
note, was to achieve a rapprochement between rhetoric and dialectic 
(defined broadly as reason). To achieve this objective, Perelman 
identified argumentation as the rationality of the vita activa.  
Argumentation and demonstration, Perelman wrote, were members 
of the larger family of reason, but the latter was reserved for the vita 
contemplativa, while the former served as the living logic of the vita 
activa.  This living logic was expressed as action through argument. 
 
 
Argumentation as Reasoned Action 
 
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca reflected on the nature of 
argumentation in an article published the aftermath of their 1958 
Traité de l'argumentation: la nouvelle rhétorique: 
 
The action of the orator is an aggression, because it always aims to change 
something, to transform the listener. . . . . This action intends to cause another; the 
desired adherence will be rendered by an action or at least by a disposition to action. 
It is not enough to obtain a decision; this decision truly manifests itself only if, when 
the time comes, it is capable of triggering an action . . . . (Perelman and Olbrechts-
Tyteca 1958a, 116-117) 
 
Argumentation is neither static nor esoteric for Perelman; it has a 
specific purpose of putting reason into action. Perelman here 
transforms Paulhan‟s idea of communication with the self, making it 
dialogic. Argumentation cannot be carried out in isolation; it is only 
in discussing with others that the difficulties that one encounters can 
be elucidated. Perelman here envisions the very practice of 
argumentation as the interaction between people, and not simply, as 
Paulhan describes in his concept of the creation of literature and 
language, the interaction of the author with his work, or the speaker 
with his speech. According to Perelman, the action of an orator is an 
argument designed to inspire that audience to another action, a 
notion we discuss more fully below (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 
1958a).  This was not the primary objective of a demonstrative proof, 
or apodictic logic. Perelman held that argument takes place in history 
with a specific purpose: to move the listener to make a decision, 
thereby creating in the audience the disposition to act. 
  
 
     
Perelman thus folds his discussions of liberty and responsibility 
into a theory of argumentative action.  When a person makes a 
decision, he judges the plausibility of different argumentative theses. 
In the act of judging, the person must assume the responsibility of his 
decision and of his choice. Indeed, the decision-making process, the 
movement of time, and change are important as audiences and reason 
adapt to new experiences and contexts. Consequently, in order to 
have some moral or even simply human value, this decision cannot 
be a necessary choice, and yet in the same regard it cannot be 
without justification. A decision must be predicated upon an 
individual‟s thoughtful and considered reflection on the possible 
choices, and he must be able to justify the reasons for which he came 
to make that decision. 
In his “Quest for the Rational,” Perelman ties the notion of 
responsibility to philosopher‟s creation of audience (Perelman 
1950b). The “principle of responsibility” provides something near to 
an objective value of philosophical argumentation.  The philosopher 
cannot deny or ignore a priori the opinions of those who are satisfied 
with a particular argumentation. If the philosopher desires to obtain 
the agreement of peers, he or she needs to justify this choice and 
explain the reasons for which it seemed preferable to him. This idea 
led Perelman to an emphasis on audience. 
Perelman argued that the core of a new rationalism was the 
movement away from timeless and impersonal standards of 
knowledge and value to standards embraced by audiences and 
humans.  The test of a claim or an argument is the acceptance of it by 
a qualified audience.  Ultimately, the person making an argument is 
responsible to and judged by an audience. Two critical concepts in 
the new rhetoric project, the epideictic and the universal audience, 
emerge from this view of responsibility. 
In a direct refutation of Sartre, Perelman writes in 1949: “Man 
does not find himself faced with nothingness when he has to choose, 
and his decisions are not absurd” (Frank and Bolduc 2003, 198).  
Perelman argued that humans are born into social worlds in which 
traditions, values, and knowledge exist to assist in value choices.  
These touchstones are not meaningless, as the Vienna Circle 
advocates and Sartre would insist, nor are they absolute as 
totalitarians might argue.  They help in making decisions and 
choices, and are revisable in the face of new experience and 
  
 
     
evidence.  Accordingly, Perelman refurbished Aristotle‟s notion of 
epideictic, linking it directly to action. 
Aristotle, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca write, believed that 
epideictic discourse had “nothing to do” with action (Perelman and 
Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969b, 48). Epideictic speeches, according to 
Aristotle and the ancient Greeks, were “uncontroversial and without 
practical consequences” (48). Audiences listened to epideictic 
speeches and “merely applauded and went away” (48). These 
speeches were “show-pieces” for an audience of spectators, and 
concerned themselves with the aesthetics of form. Indeed, Perelman 
and Olbrechts-Tyteca argue that Aristotle conflates beauty with the 
aesthetic value of a speech (48). 
In contrast, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca believe the epideictic 
is the foundational genre of discourse because it “strengthens the 
disposition toward action by increasing adherence to the values it 
lauds”(50).  Epideictic discourse draws upon the language, traditions, 
values, and knowledge held by an audience before they hear a 
speech.  Without question, an audience might hold repugnant or 
barbaric values, and these would need to give way to more tolerant 
and uplifting outlooks.  These audiences will also hold noble values 
that may need to be activated.  Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca did 
not intend their critique to be a scholastic exercise. In fact, they 
illustrate their refurbished view of the epideictic with a reference to 
French inaction during World War Two.  Citing Simone Weil‟s The 
Need for Roots, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca endorse the view 
that had the French been called to enact their own values, those, in 
Weil‟s words, that “were already in the hearts of the people, or in the 
hearts of certain active elements of the nation” (54) the resistance 
would have been as a result more effective and widespread. 
Action, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca argued, should be the 
result of a universal vision, one that was still rooted in the experience 
of life. Argumentation as an expression of reason had to have the 
pretensions of universality. The philosopher must create in his or her 
mind a universal audience; therefore, the philosopher‟s reasoning 
must be able to gain the support of all reasonable minds. However, 
as Perelman insisted, this universal audience is never defined by a 
unanimous and eternal adherence to a philosophical position; as a 
creation of the philosopher‟s own mind, it is historically and socially 
situated. The rational, in this conception, will vary and change 
according to the culture, time period, and even discipline from which 
  
 
     
it arises. Philosophers, continues Perelman, must take into account 
the historical context of this universal audience, making it as 
complex and nuanced as the moment in which we live allows. 
Like the epideictic, Perelman did not see the universal audience 
as an abstract concept.  As the vice chair of a United Nations 
committee dedicated to unveiling the philosophical bases of human 
rights, Perelman worked with a host of philosophers to determine if 
there were shared beliefs across cultures regarding the status of 
human rights. He and his colleagues discovered, after studying the 
results of an international survey directed to philosophers around the 
world, that most cultures had traditions designed to secure human 
rights.  This finding coincided with his initial efforts to outline a new 
rhetoric and his first articulation of the universal audience. 
Accordingly, the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights, a 
statement that captured the values of 48 nations, was in part a 
function of an actualized universal audience (Schreiber 1999).  
Scholars suggest that the lives of many hundreds of people have been 
spared as a result of the document (Glendon 2001).  For our 
purposes, it illustrates how Perelman‟s notion of a universal audience 
operated in action and was unavoidably a construction affected by 
the time and space of the arguer and the audience. 
Perelman further develops the practical aspects of time‟s 
influence on argumentation, recognizing the inextricable relationship 
between action and time (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1958a, 
118).
 
His notion of temporality in argumentation is clearly derived 
from Henri Bergson‟s notion of time as duration (durée) (Perelman 
and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1958a, 131-132). Bergson‟s concept of durée 
characterizes time as plural, experienced by consciousness rather 
than an external physical framework (Lacey 1989, 17-66).  Perelman 
uses the duality inherent in Bergson‟s philosophy to reverse the 
typical understanding of rhetoric (Lacey 1989, 3-4, 65-66, 180-181). 
Rhetoric is not simply devoted to figures of style, in other words, 
connected solely to the worlds of appearance, impurity, and the 
vagaries of time implicit in the notion of temporality. Rhetoric, in 
Perelman‟s formulation, is instead linked to the creativity and 
freedom of human experience that is Bergson‟s durée. 
For Bergson, durée implies the liberty of the agent, of the person 
who reasons (Lacey 1989, 30-39).
 
The notion of durée thus 
highlights the place of the person in history and time, and his 
freedom to make a certain decision. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 
  
 
     
translate Bergson‟s humanistic philosophy into a focus on the human 
experience of argumentation. The person who argues thus 
“intervenes at each moment with his stability, but also with his 
faculty of choice, his creative liberty, the unforeseen turns of his 
behavior, and the precariousness of his commitments”(Perelman and 
Olbrechts-Tyteca 1958a, 113).  More important, Perelman extends 
Bergson‟s idea of self-creation in reasoning beyond the individual, 
and to argument itself. Argumentation, they write, “supposes a living 
language, with all that this entails of tradition, of ambiguity, of 
permanent evolution”(122). Perelman highlights the mutable aspect 
of argumentation; because it is associated with living, changing 
humans, and takes place in an ever-changing social and historical 
context, argumentation is perpetually transformed based on its 
association with human beings and human language. As a result, 
Perelman considers argumentation as dependent on the social and 
historical context; the person who argues is bound by, and acts in 
accordance with, time. For Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 
argumentation is unlike scientific demonstration, just as reasoning is 
unlike geometry for Bergson; both reject the bonds of an impersonal 
and universal absolute. Human reason and action are marked by their 
place in time. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The evolution of Perelman‟s philosophy and rediscovery of 
rhetoric were due to the crises of reason faced by philosophers in the 
aftermath of World War II.  Perelman understood the limitations of 
scientism and logical positivism and saw the danger in rejecting 
reason in favor of radical skepticism. Perelman and Olbrechts-
Tyteca‟s reconstituted rhetoric was designed to expand reason 
beyond the realm of the vita contemplativa into the vita activa, doing 
so to deal with probable truths. 
Perelman‟s rediscovery of rhetoric was, as we have illustrated, a 
function of an agenda shared by the larger philosophical community 
to consider the complicity of reason in the horrors of World War II. 
Between 1945 and 1950, Perelman turned from logical positivism to 
rhetoric, doing so to meet Pos‟ vision of a life influenced by reason. 
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca saw in Ciceronian rhetoric the 
possibility of reason that could yoke the vita contemplativa with the 
  
 
     
vita activa through argumentation.  Their philosophy of argument 
offered a partial solution to the crises of reason.   Over fifty-five 
years after his rhetorical turn, we can acknowledge the contribution 
of Perelman to the rehabilitation of reason and of an articulation of a 
vita activa grounded in rhetoric. 
The major question, however, remains: does a reason of rhetoric 
and argumentation better guarantee responsibility and humane 
behavior? Does a rhetorically inflected sense of reason provide for 
the grounds of judgment in the realm of the vita activa?  Perelman 
and Olbrechts-Tyteca thought so, and believed that argumentation 
cultivated respect and tolerance, while offering the tools for 
judgment.  We believe Perelman intuited that there was something 
profoundly moral and ethical about genuine argumentation. 
Indeed, his intuition is supported by subsequent empirical 
support by the Oliners. The Oliners found that the one characteristic 
distinguishing those who resisted from those who collaborated with 
the Nazis during World War II was the parental style of childrearing.  
Those who resisted the Nazi tyranny came from homes in which 
children were encouraged to question, argue, and given the freedom 
to dissent.  Children raised by parents who used corporal punishment 
or did not endorse questions or argument emerged as adults far more 
likely to comply with totalitarian thought and action.  We believe 
this is a critically important insight as it positions argument and 
rhetoric as forces that give rise to humane behavior and concern for 
others. As we read the stirring words of the closing paragraphs of the 
New Rhetoric, we believe that Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 
succeeded in setting forth a blueprint and numerous illustrations of 
how reason functions rhetorically, providing civil society with a third 
way between absolutes.  The origins of this blueprint can be found in 
their attempt to move reason beyond the vita contemplativa to the 
vita activa. 
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